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Non-Technical Summary 
 
 
This paper constitutes – to our knowledge – the first econometric analysis on stock market 
effects of the EU Emission Trading Scheme. We analyse electricity stock return reactions to 
changes in EU Emission Allowance (EUA) prices, taking into account possible asymmetries 
in the relationship between EUA price changes and electricity stock returns, as well as 
country- and time-specific effects. Moreover, we test whether EUA return volatility and 
European electricity stock volatility are related. Our results suggest that EUA price increases 
(decreases) positively (negatively) affect stock returns from the most important electricity 
corporations covered by the EU ETS. In this respect, the electricity corporations considered 
are upvalued in case of an EUA appreciation, and downvalued in situations where the price of 
EU Emission Allowances falls. The effect differs from country to country: Amongst the 
electricity corporations considered, Spanish corporations are shown to exhibit a negative 
EUA-to-stock market relationship. In contrast, the effect is positive for corporations from 
other countries such as Germany and the UK. Stock markets do not seem to react differently 
to EUA appreciations in comparison to depreciations. Moreover, electricity stock return and 
EUA price change volatility are not shown to be positively related.  
 
Given these results, it becomes apparent that EU ETS effectively has an impact on financial 
markets and has economic consequences, affecting the value of the corporations covered. The 
first ETS phase seems to be marked at least to some extent by uncertainty of financial market 
agents concerning the importance of the newly created EU carbon market for the stock 
market: The EUA effect on electricity stocks is shown to vary over time, being especially 
high during the EUA market shock in early 2006. Such a “premium” on the EUA effect could 
be based on the exceptionally high attention of the general public (and seemingly also of stock 
market agents) to the carbon market at that time. The fact that EUA price changes positively 
affect European electricity stocks (at least for most countries analysed) is the consequence of 
fully rational electricity pricing under a grandfathering allocation rule if pass-through for 
costs created by the ETS is possible. This result, however, calls into question free allowance 
allocation to these corporations, as free allocation is seen as an instrument to support firms 
suffering from production cost increases generated by EUA price rises. The “inverse” EUA 
effect for the Spanish corporations could stem from stringent price regulation at the Spanish 
electricity market, where cost pass-through, in contrast to the electricity markets in other 
European countries, is not possible.  
 
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
 
 
Dieses Papier untersucht die Aktienmarkteffekte von Preisentwicklungen auf dem Markt für 
Emissionszertifikate im Rahmen des Europäischen Emissionshandelssystems (EU ETS). Die 
Analyse fokussiert dabei auf die Aktienmarktperformance des europäischen 
Elektrizitätssektors, der gemessen an CO2-Emissionen größten Branche im EU ETS. Nach 
unseren Ergebnissen spielt der Zertifikatmarkt eine wichtige Rolle für die 
Aktienentwicklungen der analysierten Elektrizitätsfirmen. Ein Anstieg des Zertifikatpreises 
sorgt für Kursgewinne bei den Aktien der Elektrizitätsfirmen aus fast allen europäischen 
Ländern. Hingegen scheint die Volatilität der Emissionsrechte entgegen anderslautender 
Erwartungen nicht auf die Aktienkursentwicklung der untersuchten Unternehmen zu wirken.  
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Abstract: This paper constitutes – to our best knowledge – the first econometric analysis on 
stock market effects of the EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS). Our results suggest that 
EU Emission Allowance (EUA) price developments matter to the stock performance of 
electricity firms: EUA price changes and stock returns of the most important European 
electricity corporations are shown to be positively related. This effect does not work 
asymmetrically, so that stock markets do not seem to react differently to EUA appreciations in 
comparison to depreciations. The carbon market effect is shown to be both time- and country-
specific: It is particularly strong for the period of EUA market shock in early 2006, and differs 
with respect to the countries where the electricity corporations analysed are headquartered. 
Stock market reactions to EUA volatility could not be shown.  
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I. Introduction 
 
In 2005, the European Union Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) was 
launched. Against the institutional background of the Kyoto Protocol that requires European 
countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions on average by 8% until 2012 compared 
with 1990 emissions levels (UNFCCC, 1997), the EU ETS represents a cornerstone of the EU 
member states’ climate policy. Applying to four industrial sectors in its first phase (2005 to 
2007)1, the ETS covers approximately 46% of the total CO2 emissions of EU countries. The 
energy sector, and, at the sub-sectoral level, the electricity industry is the most dominant 
player within the scheme. Of some 10 000 installations covered, approximately 3600 are 
affiliated to the power and heating industry. These installations make up 1.2 billion tons of 
CO2 emissions within the scheme, while overall ETS emissions do not even reach 2 billion 
tons (Ellerman and Buchner, forthcoming). 
 
Although overall allowance allocation in the first phase of the scheme has been qualified as 
relatively generous by many scholars (e.g. Ellerman and Buchner, forthcoming, Kettner et al., 
2008), since its initiation the EU ETS has led to discussions on potential losses in 
competitiveness for the companies covered. According to Neuhoff et al. (2006), due to the 
sequential allocation process of EU ETS, decisions in the power sector are distorted. 
Moreover, the electricity sector seems to be rather an exception as far as generous allowance 
allocation is concerned. Buchner et al. (2006) show that this sector has been the only one that 
faced a net short position already in 2005. The authors attribute the relatively stringent 
allowance allocation for this sector to both the absence of international competition and the 
assumption of comparably low emission abatement costs in electricity generation.  
 
Previous quantitative studies have assessed the economic implications of the EU ETS 
predominantly in numerical modelling frameworks. Böhringer et al. (2005) show that the 
exclusive coverage of energy-intensive installations by the ETS implies that – in the absence 
of the Kyoto Protocol’s project-based mechanisms – the remaining industries outside the ETS 
have to be regulated by complementary abatement policies in order to meet the national 
Kyoto targets. This implies that under a generous ETS cap, negative economic effects may be 
much larger for sectors outside than inside the ETS. Assessing both the economy-wide and 
the sectoral competitiveness effects of the EU ETS, Alexeeva-Talebi and Anger (2007) argue 
that the burden on ETS sectors might be minimised even under ambitious caps of the scheme 
if the project-based mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol are available and if the EU ETS is 
linked to other emerging trading systems outside Europe. 
 
Empirical evidence on the economic consequences of EU ETS is, in contrast, rather scant. 
Demailly and Quirion (forthcoming) provide a case study on the iron and steel industry, 
suggesting that losses in competitiveness for this sector are small. From a case study for the 
German electricity industry, Hoffmann (2007) concludes that, while being an important driver 
for small-scale investments, EU ETS has only limited impact on large-scale investment. 
Zachmann and von Hirschhausen (forthcoming) analyse the impact of EU Emission 
Allowance (EUA) price developments on German wholesale electricity prices; they find 
evidence for an asymmetric cost pass-through in a sense that rising EUA prices affect 
electricity prices more strongly than falling EUA prices. They attribute this finding to either 
slowly developing knowledge about EUAs as a cost factor or to a possible exercise of market 
power by German electricity generators. Anger and Oberndorfer (2008) analyse the impact of 
relative allowance allocation on both economic performance and employment of German 
                                                 
1 These sectors are energy (e.g. electric power, oil refinement), production and processing of ferrous metals, 
minerals (e.g. cement, glass), as well as pulp and paper. 
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companies using econometric techniques. They do not find evidence for revenue and 
employment effects of relative allowance allocation. The impact of EUA price developments 
on firm performance, in contrast, has not yet been analysed, yet. In this respect, this paper 
aims at starting to fill this gap. The focus is on financial market impacts of EU allowance 
price developments for European electricity corporations, i.e. for firms of the most important 
EU ETS sector (as measured by its emissions).  
 
In this respect, this analysis represents an early approach of policy evaluation with regard to 
the scheme: Against the background of stock prices representing discounted cash flows of the 
respective corporations (Fama, 1970), we assess how the market for EU Emission Allowances 
(the so-called carbon market2) affects the value of corporations covered by the scheme. The 
EUA price effect is especially relevant for the future development of the EU ETS. Already in 
the second ETS phase (which started in 2008), regulation by allowance allocation via 
grandfathering has become more stringent (Schleich et al., 2007). Such development is 
expected to continue given the climate policy goals of the EU aiming at an emission reduction 
in greenhouse gases of 20% by 2020 (30% if there is an international agreement committing 
other developed countries to comparable emission reductions, European Commission, 2008). 
As shown by numerical simulations, the stricter the allowance allocation, the higher is the 
EUA price (cp. e.g. Anger, 2008). This result underlines the importance of knowledge 
concerning the stock market effects as an indicator of economic effects of EUA price 
developments. Particularly, if corporations covered by the scheme were upvalued by EUA 
price rises that indicate stringency of regulation within the ETS, free allowance allocation to 
these corporations could be questioned: Free allocation can act as a temporary subsidy to 
support firm balance sheets, which may be justified for sectors to which production cost 
increases as indicated by EUA price rises may not be passed on to the consumers particularly 
due to international competition (Hepburn et al., 2006). The values of corporations from such 
sectors, however, should not increase when the EUA price rises. Apart from policy evaluation 
with respect to possible EUA price effects on the value of corporations covered by the EU 
ETS, the question about how financial markets perceive carbon constraints that may emerge 
due to ETS regulation has been qualified as very important from a corporate management 
point of view (Busch and Hoffmann, 2007). This knowledge is particularly important for 
hedging against EUA price risks, enabling investors to take into account feedback from the 
stock market when the EUA price moves.  
 
In this paper, we analyse electricity stock return reactions to changes in EU Emission 
Allowance prices. We take into account possible differences in such a relationship over time – 
with respect to the EUA market shock in early 2006 – as well as between corporations. This is 
particularly relevant to corporations operating in different countries that are marked by 
differences especially in allowance allocation (and therefore in possibly different initial EUA 
long / short positions) according to the different National Allocation Plans (NAPs) or in the 
structure of the respective electricity market, possibly affecting EUA cost pass-through 
behaviour. We investigate whether the relationship between EUA price changes and 
electricity stock returns is asymmetric, which would be consistent with the EUA effect on 
German wholesale electricity prices. Additionally, we apply a GARCH approach in order to 
test whether EUA return volatility and European electricity stock volatility are related. The 
remainder of this paper is structured as follows: The following chapter presents the three main 
hypotheses for our empirical investigation. In chapter three, we highlight our methodological 
                                                 
2 The markets for certificates such as Certified Emission Reductions (CERs), Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) 
and Voluntary Emission Reductions (VERs) are also emerging carbon markets; because of the particular 
relevance of EUAs is the context of this study, these markets are neglected here and “carbon market” is used as a 
synonym for the market for EU Emission Allowances here. 
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approach; in section four we describe the dataset. Chapter five gives the results of the 
econometric examination. Chapter six concludes. 
 
II. Hypotheses 
 
Hypothesis 1: EU Emission Allowance price increases (decreases) positively (negatively) 
affect electricity stock returns. 
 
Benz and Trück (2006) specify EU Emission Allowances as a factor of production held by the 
respective firm: EUAs are exhausted for CO2 emission and removed from the market after 
utilisation. In this respect, EUA price changes directly change the value of EUAs held and 
therefore the value of the respective firm (i.e. increase in case of EUA appreciations, and vice 
versa). Moreover, economic theory, modelling studies as well as the first empirical papers 
available suggest that the EU ETS and especially developments in the EU carbon market 
influence cash flows of the companies covered by the scheme. While generally high prices of 
CO2 emission could be interpreted as an indicator of stringency of regulation shrinking future 
cash flows, scholars have argued that under the EU ETS effects could work differently. 
Following Sijm et al. (2006), profits for the marginal production unit for electricity will rise 
by the respective CO2 costs for this unit if Emission Allowances are fully grandfathered. 
Profit increases for the infra-marginal unit (under full grandfathering) will depend on the 
carbon intensity of this unit relative to the intensity of the marginal unit, and will 
consequently be lower than the CO2 costs for the production unit only if the infra-marginal 
unit is more carbon-intensive than the marginal unit.3 This suggests that, under full 
grandfathering4, electricity generators can profit from EU ETS and that the profit increase 
itself is positively related to the EUA prices. Against this background, expected future cash 
flows of electricity generators covered by the ETS should rise (fall) with rising (falling) EUA 
prices, leading to rising (falling) stock returns under the hypothesis of efficient capital 
markets (if financial markets incorporate news into security prices without delay, e.g. Fama, 
1970). It is possible, however, that the amplitude of this effect itself depends particularly on 
country-specific characteristics such as differences in EUA long / short positions due to 
country-specific NAPs (i.e. relative allowance allocation) and the structure of the national 
electricity market in which a corporation operates. Moreover, it is unclear whether such an 
effect would be stable over time, particularly with respect to the EUA market shock in early 
2006 that caused a structural break in the EUA prices (Alberola et al., 2008a). 
 
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between EU Emission Allowance price changes and electricity 
stock returns is asymmetric. 
 
Zachmann and von Hirschhausen’s (forthcoming) estimation results suggest that – at least in 
Germany – electricity generation businesses can increase their future cash flows in times of 
rising EU Emission Allowance prices, as these price rises are passed through to the wholesale 
electricity market. In contrast, cash flows would barely shrink in case of falling EUA prices, 
as electricity prices seem to respond less strongly to falling in comparison to rising EUA 
prices. Given this, expected future cash flows and therefore stock returns of European 
electricity corporations should respond asymmetrically to EUA price developments. However, 
                                                 
3 This reasoning does only hold if emission trading does not lead to a change in the merit order and if the 
electricity demand response to the price increases induced is not large enough to stop the operation of a set of 
power generators (Sijm et al., 2006). 
4 Although auctioning of up to 5% of total EUAs was permitted during the first phase of the scheme (2005-
2007), the member states made little use of this option. Almost all emission allowances were grandfathered by 
means of National Allocation Plans. 
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reasons for an asymmetric cost pass-through are largely unknown – Zachmann and von 
Hirschhausen (forthcoming) propose market power as well as little knowledge of the recently 
developed ETS market as explanations – as is the answer to the question whether such an 
asymmetric cost pass-through applies to the German wholesale electricity market only or to 
all European electricity markets, including long-term and consumer-specific electricity 
contracts that are widespread. Against this background, the relationship between EUA price 
changes and stock returns from electricity corporations could be asymmetric, and these 
asymmetric effects could be country-specific.  
  
Hypothesis 3: EUA volatility is positively related to electricity stock return volatility. 
 
Not only appreciations and depreciations in levels of the EU Emission Allowances may 
matter for the market development of electricity stocks. An increase (decline) in volatility in 
the market for EUAs should render the expectations for future cash flows of the corporations 
covered more (less) volatile. This issue is of special relevance given the high volatility of the 
EUA price since the establishment of the EU ETS; hedging against unexpected carbon price 
fluctuations is an important issue here (Benz and Trück, forthcoming). Moreover, price 
volatility of stocks is highly relevant for the attractiveness of the respective asset for potential 
investors. In the context of a simple (μ,σ)-rule (Markowitz, 1952), for instance, both the – 
desired – expected return and the – undesired – volatility matter to portfolio selection.  
 
III. Empirical Approach 
 
The main objective of this paper is to address the impacts of EU Emission Allowance price 
developments on stock performance of European electricity corporations. For this purpose, on 
the one hand, we make use of an equal-weighted portfolio of the most important electricity 
stocks from the Eurozone. On the other hand, we analyse stock returns of these corporations 
in disaggregated form within the framework of a panel approach, i.e. for a richer dataset and 
without loss of information due to portfolio aggregation. This allows for identifying firm-
specific EUA effects (e.g. with respect to the countries where the corporations analysed are 
headquartered), while we have to refrain from analysing stock return volatility in this 
framework, as Panel GARCH models are a topic of current econometric research (Cermeno 
and Grier, 2003).  
 
In order to avoid misspecification of the econometric approach, we include the market return 
as well as oil, gas, and electricity price changes as control variables into the estimated 
equations. The relationship between the market return and the returns of single stocks or stock 
portfolios has its theoretical foundations in the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM; Sharpe, 
1964, and Lintner, 1965), suggesting that the reward-to-risk ratio for any security (such as a 
stock) in relation to that of the overall market is the decisive factor for the pricing of the 
respective security. However, the existing literature has also stressed the importance of 
resource price change variables as determinants of energy stock prices. Manning (1991) for 
the UK oil industry, Hammoudeh et al. (2004) for its U.S. counterpart, Faff and Brailsford 
(1999) for the Australian oil and gas sector, and Sadorsky (2001) and Boyer and Filion (2007) 
for the Canadian energy industry show that besides the market return, the oil and, in some 
cases, the gas price change may be important drivers of stock returns of energy-related 
businesses. European energy stocks, according to Oberndorfer (2008), are sensitive to oil, but 
not to gas price changes. Moreover, Oberndorfer (2008) shows that energy stock volatility is 
not related to volatility in the resource market.  
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The inclusion of oil and gas price changes as explanatory variables for electricity stock 
returns is especially important given the possibility that resource price changes may not only 
be drivers of energy stock prices, but also of the EUA price itself (e.g. Mansanet-Bataller et 
al., 2007). In this respect, the exclusion of (statistically significant) resource price variables – 
as well as of electricity price variables that are affected by the EUA prices themselves 
(Zachmann and von Hirschhausen, forthcoming) – may cause severely biased estimates with 
respect to the effect of the EUA price change on electricity stock returns. This could result in 
a statistically significant EUA effect that is simply due to impacts of resource or electricity 
price developments. In this respect, our basic approach with regard to the analysis of the 
electricity stock portfolio is: 
 
1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ,t m t eua t o t g t e tr r r r r r tα β β β β β= + + + + + +ε       (1) 
 
Here,  and are the returns for the electricity stock portfolio and the market portfolio at 
the end of period t (i.e., between t–1 and t). Equation (1) additionally includes the change of 
the EUA price , the change of the oil price , of the gas price , and of the electricity 
price . 
tr
,e tr
tmr ,
euar t, tor , tgr ,
tε  is the disturbance term with ( )tE ε 0=  and ( )var t 2ε σ= . α  and 1β , 2β , 3β , 4β , 
5β  besides 2σ are the unknown parameters that have to be estimated by OLS. 
 
We additionally use a Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) 
application. Models of the GARCH-class (Bollerslev, 1986) are very appealing approaches 
for the analysis of high-frequent time series in financial markets. The reason for this is the fact 
that they address the phenomenon of volatility clustering, i.e. of a positive correlation 
between current and past volatility of asset returns. Amongst those approaches, the use of the 
GARCH(1,1) model (i.e. an ARMA(1,1) model for the conditional variance of the mean 
equation error term that is jointly estimated with the mean equation itself, here as usual by 
maximum likelihood) is widespread as it generally sufficiently explains systematic variation 
of asset price volatility (cp. e.g. Andersen and Bollerslev, 1998). We augment such 
GARCH(1,1) framework by including EU Emission Allowance, oil, gas and electricity 
volatility variables into the variance equation. Doing this, we allow for the conditional 
variance of the ideosynchratic error term of the portfolio to be not only determined by its own 
dynamics, but also by “external” factors. In this respect, our approach relates to the literature 
of so-called volatility spillovers (cp. e.g. Hamao et al., 1990) – in our setting from the energy 
(including the carbon) market to the stock market segment of electricity corporations.  
 
1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ,t m t eua t o t g t e tr r r r r r tα β β β β β= + + + + + +ε
,e t
        (2) 
2
1 1 1 , 2 , 3 , 4t t t eua t o t g th a bh c d v d v d v d vε− −= + + + + + +       (3) 
 
,eua tv  represents EUA volatility,  oil volatility, ,o tv ,g tv  gas volatility,  electricity volatility. 
We assume (Student) t-distribution for the zero mean error term
,e tv
tε .  is the conditional 
variance of the error term. 
th
α , 1β , 2β , 3β , 4β , 5β , , , , , , and besides are 
the unknown parameters that are estimated by maximum likelihood.  
a b c 1d 2d 3d 4d th
 
As indicated, we additionally apply a panel data approach taking into account disaggregate 
stock returns of all electricity corporations i forming the portfolio, allowing for the use of a 
much richer dataset in both observations and information compared to a portfolio approach 
(cp. e.g. Boyer and Filion, 2007). The respective approach can thus be formulated as 
,i tr
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, 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ,i t m t eua t o t g t e t i tr r r r r r ,α β β β β β= + + + + + +ε
                                                
.      (4) 
 
Variable definition and parameter estimation via OLS is analogous to equation (1). This basic 
panel framework is augmented by interaction terms between the EUA price change and 
country-specific indicator variables in order to take into account country-specific stock market 
effects of EUA price developments.  
,eua tr
 
Additionally, in all approaches interaction terms between the EUA price change and an 
indicator variable that takes the value of zero for EUA price decreases (as well as for price 
changes of zero) and the value of one for EUA price increases are incorporated in order to 
take into account possible asymmetries in the relationship between the EUA price change and 
the electricity stock and portfolio returns respectively. Moreover, in the panel approach this 
variable is also interacted with country indicator variables as described above in order to test 
for country-specific asymmetries. As a further model extension for all approaches, an 
interaction term between the EUA price change and an indicator variable for the EUA market 
shock period in early 2006 and for the period before this market shock respectively are 
incorporated into the empirical analysis.    
 
 
IV. Data and Variables 
 
Our analysis covers roughly the first period of the European Union Emission Trading 
Scheme, with a constraint for the very early ETS phase for which no EU Emission Allowance 
price data is available: We have a sufficient data basis for the EU Allowance settlement price 
(and for all other variables) from August, 4, 2005 until June 19, 2007. 5 Given this sample 
period of barely two years, daily data is the only realistic frequency for our econometric 
approach as weekly or monthly data would provide too few observations in order to conduct a 
serious time series analysis. In this respect, we are fully aware of the fact that low frequency 
data (i.e. weekly or monthly data) is often preferred in comparison to daily data in order to 
circumvent errors-in-variables problems in terms of irregularities, which is especially due to 
low – daily – trading (volumes) (cp. e.g. Scholes and Williams, 1977). As electricity 
corporations in general (and this also holds for the corporations considered here) are stocks 
with high trading volumes, such errors-in-variables problems should be negligible in our 
setting. EUA settlement price data stems directly from the European Energy Exchange (EEX), 
Leipzig. This is, together with Nord Pool, European Climate Exchange, and Powernext, the 
predominant EUA marketplace. EUA price data from EEX, Leipzig, is publicly available for 
scientific use and free of charge. Moreover, as reported by Mansanet-Bataller et al. (2007), 
EUA prices have developed very similarly in all marketplaces, so that the choice of 
marketplace should not be crucial for the analysis. All other series used in our analysis are 
taken from Datastream (Thomson Financial).  
 
Stock returns of the most important electricity corporations whose business is affected by EU 
ETS form the dependent variable of our analysis. The return series are analysed individually 
(pooled) within a panel data framework, as well as aggregated within an equal-weighted 
portfolio. For the analysis, we choose electricity corporations included in the Dow Jones Euro 
Stoxx Utilities Index (as at August 1, 2007), for which financial market (return) data is 
 
5 This corresponds to the length of the EUA settlement price time series the European Energy Exchange (EEX), 
Leipzig, made available to the authors. Generally, it seems difficult to integrate data from late 2007, as EUA 
prices did barely vary at that period due to the high relative allocation within the scheme.  
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available for the whole sample period. Corporations whose main business activity is the 
generation (and distribution) of electricity from renewable resources have been excluded 
given their low exposure to the ETS regulation. All in all, the corporations forming our stock 
portfolio are Aem (Italy - IT), British Energy Group (United Kingdom - UK), Eon (Germany - 
GE), Endesa (Spain - ES), Enel (IT), Energias de Portugal (Portugal - PO), Fortum (Finland - 
FI), Iberdrola (ES), International Power (UK), RWE (GE), Scottish & Southern Energy (UK), 
and Union Fenosa (ES). The electricity portfolio return series (as well as all individual stock 
return series; results available on request) is stationary according to a Dickey-Fuller unit root 
test (Table 4).6  
 
As explanatory variable of main interest we include the EUA settlement price change into our 
analysis. This series reflects the EUA price developments at the EEX, Leipzig. Although 
future or forward prices are less affected by very short run demand and supply fluctuations 
and therefore less noisy in comparison to spot prices (cp. Sadorsky, 2001), we opted for the 
settlement price instead of an EUA future from the EEX as there is little trade at the future in 
comparison to the spot market. The use of EUA futures would be very problematic for our 
analysis relying on daily data given the fact that for a multitude of days included in our 
sample period, price changes taking the value of zero due to trading volumes of zero would 
occur. Such a problem is avoided by using the EUA settlement price (change). The EUA 
price, together with price data of the electricity stock portfolio, is graphically shown in Figure 
1. Besides the EUA price change variable as such, an interaction term with an indicator 
variable that takes the value of zero for EUA price decreases (as well as for price changes of 
zero) and the value of one for EUA price increases is also applied in order to take into account 
possible asymmetric stock market effects from the carbon market.  
 
Electricity Stocks vs. EUA Prices
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Figure 1 EUA and electricity stock portfolio price data for the sample period  
 
                                                 
6 A unit root test without trend term was conducted for these as well as for all other variables used. According to 
visual inspection, none of the series exhibits trends. 
 8
As indicated in the previous section and shown in Figure 1, the release of emissions data 
revealing long EUA positions in nearly all countries covered by the EU ETS (Ellerman and 
Buchner, forthcoming) evidently led to a fall (without subsequent recovery) in EUA prices 
from nearly 30 euros in late April to approximately 10 euros in early / mid May. We created 
interaction terms between the EUA price change and an indicator variable taking the value of 
one for the EUA market shock period in early 2006 (26 April to 10 May, 2006; zero 
otherwise) as well as for the period previous to this market shock (until 25 April; zero 
respectively). Moreover, interaction terms between the EUA price change and the dummy 
variables taking the value of one (zero otherwise) for the country where the respective 
corporation is headquartered have been generated for the panel analysis. We have created 
such interaction terms for the corporations stemming from Germany, UK and Italy well as an 
aggregate indicator variable for the countries with only one corporation in the sample 
(Portugal and Finland; “others”). This means that in the panel analysis, corporations from 
Spain constitute the so-called reference category with respect to the EUA effect, to which the 
interaction terms refer. The choice of the reference category is technically inescapable and 
does not affect the overall regression results (e.g. Greene, 2003).  In addition, the same 
procedure is followed in order to test for country-specific asymmetric effects.   
 
The market return for our analysis is calculated from the Dow Jones Euro STOXX. It is the 
broadest market index of the Eurozone stock market, representing large, mid and small 
capitalisation companies of all Eurozone members. It has a varying number of components 
(September 2007: 317 corporations). In order to control for a possible impact of oil price 
changes on the electricity stock returns, we use the (Crude Oil) Brent time series (euros per 
barrel). Brent is the most relevant traded crude for European energy firms. In accordance with 
existing literature, we use a (one month) forward instead of spot return of this series. 
Consequently, we use the change of the one month forward natural gas time series from 
Intercontinentalexchange (ICE, London; euros per 100 000 British Thermal Units). We 
choose this time series for natural gas, since gas trading at the EEX, Leipzig, only started in 
2007 and EEX gas data is therefore not available for our whole sample period. Besides ICE 
and EEX, only the APX, Zeebrugge, is another European gas marketplace. However, as gas 
trading is a very recent activity here as well (since 2005), we opted in favour of the ICE data. 
The disadvantage of using ICE data, however, is that UK gas prices may be driven by 
fundamentals of its domestic supply and demand if the UK interconnector to Belgium is full 
or shut down, so that prices may temporarily decouple from continental gas prices (Kjärstad 
and Johnsson, 2007). Generally, UK and continental gas prices are, however, closely related 
due to arbitrage possibilities. The choice of the electricity price series is even more difficult, 
as no common market for electricity in the EU exists. Although price differences have 
significantly diminished over the last years, convergence of European electricity prices has 
not been achieved (Zachmann, forthcoming). In order to stick most closely to the EUA price 
data, we opted for the Phelix Month Base from the EEX, Leipzig (euros per Mega Watt 
Hour). This series reflects German electricity prices. As Germany is the biggest electricity 
market in Europe (and the EEX is one of the most liquid European power exchanges, cp. e.g. 
Zachmann, forthcoming), German electricity prices may be the best available proxy for 
overall European electricity price developments.   
 
In order to analyse whether EUA volatility and electricity stock return volatility are related, 
we incorporate different volatility variables in our framework. As explanatory volatility 
variables, we include the squared EUA, oil, gas, and electricity price changes into our 
empirical approach. These volatility variables are constructed in a very similar way compared 
to Hamao et al.’s (1990) “volatility surprises” from stock markets: The authors use the 
squared residuals from estimated augmented market models for the respective markets as 
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volatility terms. However, given the fact that price changes from the energy market (which we 
consider instead of stock markets in Hamao et al., 1990) are generally not explained by an 
(augmented) market model, our approach seems more adequate for this special setting.  
 
A look at the correlations between the variables considered in this analysis reveals that the 
dependent variable is strongly and positively related to the market excess return (Table 5). 
The correlation between EUA price change and electricity stock portfolio return is positive as 
well. Amongst the explanatory variables, the EUA price change correlates relatively strongly 
with resource price returns, underpinning the findings of Mansanet-Bataller et al. (2007). The 
absolute values of the correlation coefficients are modest, though, so that multicollinearity 
should not be too severe in our setting.7   
 
 
V. Results 
  
Basic Specification and Asymmetries 
 
Estimating Equation (1) and (4), we mostly obtain the results we expected (Table 1). They 
suggest a highly significant positive impact of the market return on electricity stock returns 
(with an estimated beta factor smaller than one). For oil, gas, and electricity price changes, 
however, no clear evidence for the direction of the impact on electricity stock returns (or, 
respectively, for an impact at all) is indicated. The findings particularly of the panel analysis, 
indicating a negative effect of oil price changes, are consistent with the previous literature on 
energy stocks. According to different specification tests reported in Table 1, there is no 
indication of any misspecification of our empirical approach.  
 
Results of all specifications reported in Table 1 are consistent with Hypothesis 1 formulated 
above and therefore provide empirical evidence for a positive impact of the EUA price change 
on electricity stock returns. Regressing the above described electricity stock portfolio return 
on the full set of explanatory variables (Equation (1)) yields a statistically even highly 
significant coefficient for the EUA price change variable. This result holds when making use 
of a Pooled OLS panel specification (Equation (4)). The value of the estimated EUA 
coefficient (0.01 to 0.02 for all settings) is modest. According to an F-Test, the null 
hypothesis of no Fixed (i.e. corporation specific) Effects cannot be rejected at any 
conventional level for this and all following specifications, indicating that Pooled OLS gives 
consistent and efficient results. We therefore refrain from reporting Fixed Effects estimation 
results.  
 
                                                 
7 Some of the correlations between energy price variables are lower than expected, particularly between the gas 
price change and both the oil and electricity price change, respectively. One reason for this finding may be the 
fact that gas prices observed at European energy exchanges seem to be rather neglected by financial market 
agents, probably due to the widespread use of long-term gas contracts (e.g. Siliverstovs et al., 2004, Oberndorfer, 
2008). 
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Table 1 Results Basic Specification and Asymmetries 
 (1) (4) Pooled OLS (1)Asymmetry (4) Pooled OLS 
Asymmetry 
α  0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00** 
(0.00) 
β1 (market) 0.74*** 
(0.04) 
0.74*** 
(0.02) 
0.73*** 
(0.05) 
0.74*** 
(0.02) 
β2 (eua) 0.02*** 
(0.01) 
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.01** 
(0.00) 
β3 (oil) 0.04* 
(0.02) 
-0.01* 
(0.01) 
0.04* 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
β4 (gas) 0.01* 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.01* 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
β5 (electricity) -0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00** 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00** 
(0.00) 
δ (asymmetric eua) 
 
- - -0.00 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Obs. 
R-squared 
F-Test 
Wald-Test (Chi-sq.) 
ARCH (Chi-sq.) 
BG-Autoc. (Chi-sq.) 
Durb. Autoc. (Chi-sq.) 
RESET-Test 
481 
0.34 
61.72*** 
- 
0.04 
0.33 
0.33 
1.44 
5772 
0.19 
273.75 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
481 
0.34 
41.53*** 
- 
0.04 
0.34 
0.33 
1.42 
5772 
0.19 
228.14*** 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Note: Standard errors in brackets (OLS estimations: White heteroskedasticity-robust s.e.). *, ** and *** show 
significance at the 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-level, respectively. None of the specification tests indicates 
misspecification. 
 
Whereas generally EUA price changes affect stock returns of European electricity 
corporations, we do not find evidence for an asymmetric reaction of electricity stock returns 
to EUA price changes. In contrast to the results provided by Zachmann and von Hirschhausen 
(forthcoming) suggesting asymmetric responses of wholesale electricity prices to EUA price 
changes, and in contrast to Hypothesis 2, such an asymmetric relationship cannot be observed 
in the stock market. An interaction term between a dummy variable taking the value of one 
when EUA price changes are positive (and zero otherwise) and the EUA price change itself 
added to Equation (1) does not yield any statistical significance. This result is unaffected by 
the elimination of insignificant explanatory variables.8  
 
GARCH-Approach and Market Shock 
 
The highly significant positive EUA effect on the electricity stock portfolio returns also holds 
when using a GARCH approach. The specification based on Equation (2)/(3) allows for 
identifying the structure of the Equation (1) error term’s conditional variance by its own 
dynamics and “external” factors (spillovers from other markets). The results from Equation 
(2)/(3) suggest, however, that electricity stock return volatility is not related to EUA price 
(change) volatility (Table 2). Moreover, we get no evidence for a statistically significant 
effect of oil, gas, and electricity market volatility on electricity stock volatility. This result is 
not affected by excluding statistically insignificant control variables from the empirical 
framework. In this respect, Hypothesis 3 suggesting a positive relationship between EUA 
volatility and electricity stock return volatility is not supported by the empirical results. 
Moreover, the results of an ARCH LM test do not indicate that volatility clustering is present 
in the electricity stock portfolio, so that the formulation of a GARCH approach is not 
beneficial in comparison to OLS. 
 
                                                 
8 The missing evidence for asymmetry in the relationship between EUA price changes and electricity stock 
returns has also proved robustness over different approaches in modelling such asymmetry. For brevity, only the 
specification lined out in chapters III and IV has been reported here. All other regression results, including 
specifications from which insignificant explanatory variables have been excluded, are available on request. 
 11
In contrast, independently of basing the analysis on Equation (1), (2)/(3), or (4), we find 
evidence for a particularly strong impact of EUA price changes on electricity stock returns 
during the period of market shock in April / May 2006, when EUA prices fell from nearly 30 
euros to approximately 10 euros in a few days only. During these days, the EUA effect is 
shown to be highly significantly stronger than later on during the sample period. In contrast, 
no statistically significant difference in the EUA effect during the pre-market shock period 
compared to the period after the shock can be shown. Moreover, the volatility analysis has not 
shown to be sensitive to the EUA market shock. Corresponding results have not been included 
in the manuscript, but are available from the authors on request. 
 
Table 2 Results GARCH Specification and Market Shock 
 (2)/(3) GARCH (1,1)
 
(2)/(3) GARCH (1,1) 
Market Shock
 
(1)Market Shock (4) Pooled OLS 
Market Shock 
Mean Equation  
α  0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
β1 (market) 0.74*** 
(0.04) 
0.74*** 
(0.04) 
0.73*** 
(0.04) 
0.74*** 
(0.02) 
β2 (eua) 0.02*** 
(0.01) 
0.01* 
(0.01) 
0.01** 
(0.01) 
0.00* 
(0.00) 
β3 (oil) 0.04* 
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
β4 (gas) 0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01* 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
β5 (electricity) -0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00* 
(0.00) 
γ1 (eua pre-market shock) 
 
- 0.05 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
γ2 (eua market shock) 
 
- 0.04* 
(0.02) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
Variance Equation 
 
 
a -14.57*** 
(0.54) 
-14.71*** 
(3.65) 
- - 
b (GARCH (1) term) 0.96*** 
(0.04) 
0.96*** 
(0.04) 
- - 
c  (ARCH (1) term) 0.03 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
- - 
d1 (eua volatility) 10.15 
(14.91) 
11.99 
(13.22) 
- - 
d2 (oil volatility) 1177.74 
(1468.04) 
1245.85 
(1516.15) 
- - 
d3 (gas volatility) 14.21 
(52.63) 
12.87 
(61.25) 
- - 
d4 (electricity volatility) 16.11 
(15.08) 
16.56  
(15.93) 
- - 
Obs. 
R-squared 
F-Test 
Wald-Test (Chi-sq.) 
ARCH (Chi-sq.) 
BG-Autoc. (Chi-sq.) 
Durb. Autoc. (Chi-sq.) 
RESET-Test 
481 
- 
- 
846.86*** 
- 
- 
- 
- 
481 
- 
- 
305.43 
- 
- 
- 
- 
481 
0.35 
46.02*** 
- 
0.05 
0.55 
0.54 
1.30 
5772 
0.19 
196.01*** 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Note: White heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in brackets *, ** and *** show significance at the 10%-, 
5%-, and 1%-level, respectively. None of the specification tests indicates misspecification. 
 
Country-Specific EUA Effects 
 
Analysing disaggregated electricity stock returns within a panel data framework suggests that 
the EUA effect on the stock market is country-specific. An F-Test on the joint significance of 
country interaction terms with the EUA price change (Table 3) leads to the rejection of the 
null hypothesis of no country-specific EUA effects at any conventional level. In this setting 
(column 1), Spanish electricity corporations as the baseline even exhibit a significantly (but 
 12
small as far as the size of the estimated coefficient is concerned) negative relationship 
between EUA price changes and stock returns. The relationship for electricity corporations 
from all other countries covered significantly differs from this. All country-specific EUA 
interaction term coefficients are positive and significantly differ from zero at least at the 5%-
level, and their absolute values suggest an overall positive EUA effect for nearly all countries 
considered. The coefficient is highest for the UK corporations covered. Also the market shock 
interaction term coefficient remains highly significant in this setting.      
  
Table 3 Results Country-Specific EUA-Effect 
 (4)Pooled OLS Country-Specific 
EUA Effect 
(4) Pooled OLS Country-Specific 
EUA Effect and Asymmetry 
α  0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.00* 
(0.00) 
β1 (market) 0.74*** 
(0.02) 
0.74*** 
(0.02) 
β2 (eua) -0.01** 
(0.00) 
-0.02*** 
(0.01) 
β3 (oil) -0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
β4 (gas) 0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
β5 (electricity) 0.00* 
(0.00) 
0.00* 
(0.00) 
γ (eua market shock) 
 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
θ1 (eua germany) 0.02*** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
θ2 (eua united kingdom) 0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
θ3 (eua italy) 0.01** 
(0.01) 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
θ4 (eua other) 0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
δ (asymmetric eua) - 0.01 
(0.01) 
κ1 (asymmetric eua germany) - -0.01 
(0.02) 
κ2 (asymmetric eua united kingdom) - -0.01 
(0.02) 
κ3 (asymmetric eua italy) - -0.01 
(0.01) 
κ3 (asymmetric eua other) - -0.00 
(0.02) 
Obs. 
R-squared 
F-Test 
F-Test on country-specific interaction terms 
F-Test on country-specific asymmetry interaction terms 
5772 
0.19 
139.70*** 
5.02*** 
- 
5772 
0.19 
93.81*** 
- 
0.56 
Note: White heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in brackets *, ** and *** show significance at the 10%-, 
5%-, and 1%-level, respectively. None of the specification tests indicates misspecification. 
 
In contrast, there is no evidence for an asymmetric effect of the EUA price change on 
electricity stock returns for any of the countries represented in our sample. None of the 
coefficients referring to such an asymmetric effect shows significance at any conventional 
level. Moreover, an F-Test on the joint significance of country interaction terms with the 
asymmetric EUA price change does not indicate the presence of such asymmetric effects.  
  
VI. Conclusions 
 
This paper constitutes – to our knowledge – the first econometric analysis on stock market 
effects of the EU Emission Trading Scheme. We analyse electricity stock return reactions to 
changes in EU Emission Allowance prices, taking into account possible asymmetries in the 
relationship between EUA price changes and electricity stock returns, as well as country- and 
time-specific effects. Moreover, within the framework of a GARCH approach we test whether 
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EUA return volatility and European electricity stock volatility are related. Our results suggest 
that EUA price increases (decreases) positively (negatively) affect stock returns from the most 
important electricity corporations covered by the EU ETS. In this respect, the electricity 
corporations considered are upvalued in case of an EUA appreciation, and downvalued in 
situations where the price of EU Emission Allowances falls. However, the effect differs from 
country to country: Amongst the electricity corporations considered, Spanish corporations are 
shown to exhibit a negative EUA-to-stock market relationship. In contrast, the effect is 
positive for corporations from other countries such as Germany and the UK. Stock markets do 
not seem to react differently to EUA appreciations in comparison to depreciations. Moreover, 
electricity stock return and EUA price change volatility are not shown to be positively related.  
 
Given these results, it becomes apparent that EU ETS effectively has an impact on financial 
(stock) markets and therefore has economic consequences, affecting the value of the 
corporations covered. While Anger and Oberndorfer (2008) cannot show economic impacts of 
relative EU Emission Allowance allocation, price developments of the EUA market matter 
from an economic and financial market point of view, a finding that may be important for 
investors e.g. seeking to hedge against EUA price risks. The first ETS phase seems to be 
marked at least to some extent by uncertainty of financial market agents concerning the 
importance of the newly created EU carbon market for the stock market: The EUA effect on 
electricity stocks is shown to vary over time, being especially high during the EUA market 
shock in early 2006. Such a “premium” on the EUA effect could be based on the 
exceptionally high attention of the general public (and seemingly also of stock market agents) 
to the carbon market at that time. In this respect, the results shed new light on Zachmann and 
von Hirschhausen’s (forthcoming) claim of slowly developing knowledge concerning the 
European Emission Allowances amongst financial market agents. The fact that EUA price 
changes positively affect European electricity stocks (at least for most countries analysed) is 
the consequence of fully rational electricity pricing under a grandfathering allocation rule if 
pass-through for costs created by the ETS is possible: Against the background of the 
European carbon market, opportunity costs of fossil power generation according to the EUA 
price exist. Due to the design of the scheme with almost 100% of Emission Allowances 
grandfathered instead of auctioned in the first phase and (initial) EUA long positions for most 
of the companies covered by the scheme, an increase in future cash flows of electricity firms 
in case of an EUA appreciation is straightforward, with positive stock market reactions as a 
logical consequence. This result, however, calls into question free allowance allocation to 
these corporations, as free allocation is seen as an instrument to support firms suffering from 
production cost increases generated by EUA price rises (Hepburn et al., 2006). 
 
At least German electricity wholesale prices seem to react asymmetrically to EUA price 
changes in that rising EUA prices have a stronger impact on electricity prices than falling 
EUA prices (Zachmann and von Hirschhausen, forthcoming). However, stock markets do not 
seem to consequently react asymmetrically in the pricing of electricity stocks. One possible 
explanation of this result may be the stock market agents’ ignorance of the asymmetric cost 
pass-through in the electricity market. Alternatively, it is unclear whether such asymmetry in 
the EUA price-to-electricity price relationship only relates to the German electricity exchange 
or to European electricity markets as a whole, where also customer-specific long-term 
contracts play an important role. This has not yet been shown. However, even for the German 
corporations considered, there is no indication of asymmetric stock market effects. Finally, we 
do not find a significant effect of EUA volatility on stock volatility for the corporations 
covered by the ETS, even against the background of a relatively volatile EU carbon market 
(Benz and Trück, forthcoming). This may weaken the widespread argument stating that 
volatility shocks from the EUA market may create economic damage to the corporations 
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covered by the scheme and deteriorate the performance of the EU ETS in comparison with 
EU-wide taxes (Baldursson and von der Fehr, 2004). Future research, however, may provide 
additional insights into this relationship, e.g. by the application of multivariate GARCH 
models (Bauwens et al., 2006). The “inverse” EUA effect for the Spanish corporations could 
stem from stringent price regulation at the Spanish electricity market, where cost pass-
through, in contrast to the electricity markets in other European countries, is not possible. 
Another factor driving this result could be the relative allocation with EU Emission 
Allowances, resulting from characteristics of the Spanish NAP: According to Kettner et al. 
(2008), the Spanish power and heat sector was, amongst its counterparts from other European 
countries, the one with the largest short position.  
 
Generally, our results refer to the current design of the scheme with almost 100% of Emission 
Allowances grandfathered instead of auctioned, to an emissions cap that is in general assessed 
to be rather generous (e.g. Ellerman and Buchner, forthcoming, Kettner et al., 2008), and to 
the power sector that is suspected to be able to pass through costs very easily to the 
consumers. Because of those phenomena, the ETS has been suspected of generating windfall 
profits for many companies covered (Sijm et al., 2006). However, a much stronger emissions 
cap in the second compared to the first phase, as it is expected from early analysis of the 
National Allocation Plans of the ETS member states (Betz et al., 2006, Schleich et al., 2007), 
may also increase economic consequences of emission regulation under the EU ETS. While 
our results suggest that a long-term EUA price rise in the future could benefit electricity 
corporations to which the ETS applies, this should particularly come true if the EUA price 
rises were to be anchored in more stringent (free) allowance allocation for corporations 
outside the electricity sector. However, as the European Commission’s (2008) recent plans 
suggest full auctioning for the power sector in 2013 – first evidence for such development is 
the rise of the auctioning limit to 10% in the second EU ETS phase (in comparison to 5% in 
the first phase) – possible benefits as suggested by the results of the empirical analysis seem 
to be at least temporally restricted. It will be interesting to see whether positive stock market 
reactions to EUA price rises will occur under such new climate policy regime. Again, 
however, benefits (or losses) for infra-marginal units will depend on the extent of EUA cost 
pass-through as well as their carbon intensity relative to the intensity of the marginal unit. The 
possibility of reduced benefits or even losses of electricity generators in case of EUA price 
rises is underlined by the evidence for Spanish electricity corporations, where cost pass-
through is restricted and allowance allocation was least generous in the first phase. 
 
This paper is among the first empirical contributions to the question of economic impacts of 
the European Union Emission Trading Scheme. Econometric analysis with respect to EU ETS 
is just evolving. Additional insights into EUA prices (cp. Alberola et al., 2008a and b, 
Mansanet-Bataller et al., 2007, or Benz and Trück, forthcoming) will be needed for the 
second EU ETS phase that started in 2008. Also the EUA impact on electricity and stock 
prices should be further examined; here it would be particularly interesting to assess whether 
or how electricity generators’ portfolios of power plants affect their stock returns’ relationship 
to the EU Emission Allowance market. Related issues that have to be tackled in order to 
complement the existing literature are widespread: Of particular interest will be the analysis 
of ETS impacts on industry relocation, trade flows, and (environmental) innovation against 
the background of the pollution haven (Cave and Blomquist, forthcoming) as well as the 
Porter hypothesis (Porter and van der Linde, 1995, and Frondel et al., forthcoming).   
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Appendix 
 
  
Table 4 Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests 
Variable Test Statistic 
r -21.187*** 
rm  -21.827*** 
rEUA  -18.287*** 
vEUA  -15.932*** 
ro -24.876*** 
vo -23.852*** 
rg -21.276*** 
vg -21.891*** 
re -30.318*** 
ve -16.158*** 
Note: *** shows significance (rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root) at the 1%-level. 
 
 
Table 5 Correlation Matrix 
 r rm rEUA vEUA ro vo rg vg re ve
r 1.0000          
rm  0.5660 1.0000         
rEUA  0.1162   -0.0108   1.0000        
vEUA -0.0820 -0.0953   -0.1635 1.0000       
ro 0.1044  0.0522   0.0805 -0.0628 1.0000      
vo 0.0316 0.0116   0.0098 0.0697 -0.1106  1.0000     
rg 0.1290   0.0694   0.1611 -0.0117 0.0586 0.0328 1.0000    
vg 0.0350   0.0149   0.0580 -0.0156 -0.0227 -0.0153 0.6169  1.0000   
re -0.0031   0.0356   -0.0416   -0.0091   -0.0021  -0.0414   -0.0144   -0.0447    1.0000  
ve 0.0276   0.0421   0.0004   -0.0325  0.0703   -0.0097  0.0140   -0.0089   -0.1329    1.0000 
Note: 481 observations. Pearson’s correlation coefficients for the respective variable pairs are given. 
 
